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Recent work on rationality has been increasingly attentive to “coherence requirements”.1 Coherence 
requirements are the requirements of rationality that have to do with the structural coherence between 
one’s mental attitudes; about how they (in a broad sense) fit together; about which combinations of 
attitudes (and absences of attitudes) it is rational or irrational to hold jointly. Familiar examples of 
possible coherence requirements include the enkratic requirement (which requires one to intend to do 
what one believe one ought to do), the instrumental requirement (which requires one to intend the 
means to one’s ends) and the noncontradiction requirement (which requires one not to believe 
contradictory propositions). Those are some of the most familiar examples, but in principle there 
could be coherence requirements on combinations of any kind of attitudinal mental states: for 
instance, perhaps certain combinations of beliefs and hopes are incoherent, or certain combinations 
of beliefs and fears. Many formal epistemologists propose that there are requirements not to have 
certain incoherent combinations of graded credal states; some propose that there are requirements 
not to combine certain graded credal states with attitudes of full belief. All of these are at least candidate 
coherence requirements in the sense I am interested in. 
As should be obvious from the list of candidate coherence requirements above, coherence in 
my sense is not restricted to logical consistency or to probabilistic coherence. Indeed, I take it to be a 
substantive question whether putative requirements of logical consistency or of probabilistic 
coherence are actually genuine (as opposed to merely putative) coherence requirements. More 
generally, ‘coherence’ is not here being used in a stipulative fashion whereby certain combinations of 
states count as incoherent by stipulation; it is always open to philosophical debate whether some 
particular combination of states is really incoherent or not. 
The foregoing loose characterization gives us some idea of the form of coherence requirements. 
Such requirements, we’ve just said, pertain to the rational permissibility or impermissibility of 
combinations of mental states. This may get us at least some way to being able to tell, given some putative 
requirement, whether it has the form of a putative coherence requirement (as opposed to some other 
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kind of putative requirement). But what it does not give us is an account of which coherence 
requirements are genuine as opposed to merely putative: of the conditions under which a combination 
of mental states really does count as incoherent. For example, the putative “requirement” that, for any 
proposition p, one is rationally required not to (hope that p is true and have a credence of 0.6 in p), 
has the right form to be a coherence requirement by the foregoing account, but it is presumably not 
plausible that this is a genuine requirement.2 As such, a purely formal account still leaves us with the 
substantive question: what is (in)coherence, really?  
There are both metaphysical and epistemological questions here. Metaphysically: what is it for 
two or more mental states to be jointly incoherent, such that they are banned by a coherence 
requirement? In virtue of what are some putative requirements genuine and others not? 
Epistemologically: how are we to know which of the requirements are genuine and which aren’t? 
Typically, theorists proceed by just listing candidate requirements and considering potential 
counterexamples.3 But in the absence of a general account of what coherence is, and thus of what we 
are looking for or having intuitions about, this procedure seems unguided. 
These questions are made more pointed in two ways. First, the list of candidate coherence 
requirements is diverse, governing both doxastic and practical mental states and including everything 
from bans on weakness of will, to norms supplied by deductive logic, to axioms of decision theory. 
They include requirements on combinations of doxastic states, requirements on combinations of 
practical states, and requirements on combinations of doxastic and practical states. One might 
reasonably wonder what, if anything, all of these requirements have in common. We should hope that 
an account of coherence requirements will explain why these requirements all belong to a single 
category, by giving some general account of what it is for mental states to be jointly incoherent. 
Secondly, one of the most lively debates in the literature on coherence requirements addresses 
the question of whether such requirements are normative, in the sense whereby a requirement is 
normative iff one necessarily has reason to comply with it.4 But this debate often takes place against a 
shared assumption that there are coherence requirements. The assumption here is not merely that 
there “are” requirements in the sense that there are putative or “candidate” requirements. Rather, the 
assumption is that there are coherence requirements in the sense that some putative coherence 
requirements are genuine and others aren’t – that one can make mistakes about whether some putative 
coherence requirement is a genuine requirement or not.5 Thus, participants in the literature seem 
willing to countenance the idea that there are coherence requirements, but yet that these requirements 
                                                 
2 As well as this obviously non-genuine requirement, there will also be controversial cases, such as the already-mentioned 
example of requirements of logical consistency and probabilistic coherence. 
3 So, e.g., Broome (2013: 150): “How can we identify requirements of rationality? I wish I could describe a general 
method of doing so, but I am sorry to say I cannot. I shall defend a number of requirements one by one, on particular 
grounds that seem appropriate […] I find myself forced to appeal largely to our intuitions.”  
4 See e.g. Kolodny (2005, 2007); Raz (2005); Broome (2005, 2013: ch. 11); Southwood (2008). 
5 For example, Kolodny (2005), the leading opponent of the view that coherence requirements are normative, 
nevertheless holds that various variations on the enkratic requirement comprise the “core” rational (coherence) 
requirements, to which all other rational requirements might be reduced (ibid.: 557), and holds that these requirements 
are narrow-scope rather than wide-scope (ibid.: 518-539). These views only make sense if we understand Kolodny as 
holding that these enkratic requirements are genuine (yet non-normative!) requirements. Similarly, Broome (2013: ch. 11) 
takes seriously the possibility that coherence requirements are not normative, but never questions the idea that they are 
nevertheless genuine requirements. 
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are not normative. But this only intensifies our question about what coherence is, and what coherence 
requirements are. If an attribution of incoherence does not necessarily amount to a charge of a 
normative failing, what exactly does it come to? And if we cannot necessarily determine whether a 
coherence requirement is genuine by thinking about whether one really ought, normatively speaking, to 
satisfy it, we seem to have even less to go on in figuring out which requirements are genuine.  
Indeed, one might worry that perhaps, the notion of a non-normative requirement doesn’t even 
really make sense. As it stands, this worry is overstated. There are clear examples of genuine but non-
normative requirements: for example, the requirements of British Victorian etiquette, of Mafia 
morality, of the grammar of the French language circa 1931, and so on. The reasons to comply with 
such requirements are at best both derivative and contingent: in themselves, they lack normative force. 
Yet there are genuine requirements of this sort, in the same that some things are actually requirements 
of Victorian etiquette, and some things aren’t. In enumerating the requirements of Victorian etiquette, 
one can get them right or get them wrong. What is a myth is the normativity of these requirements, not 
their existence. However, all of these requirements are plausibly conventional in nature. They are 
requirements in virtue of conventional facts about the practices of Victorian Brits, Mafiosi, and French 
speakers in 1931. Yet it is less compelling that the requirements of coherence can be understood as 
fixed by any convention.  So what we really are struggling to make sense of are not non-normative yet 
genuine requirements per se, but genuine requirements that are neither normative nor purely 
conventional. Again, a general account of what coherence is would be of great help here.  
This paper is an attempt to give such an account. My account will be guided by three aims. 
First, it will aim to unify different, diverse coherence requirements, and to show what they have in 
common. Second, it will aim to provide us with principled criteria for determining whether coherence 
requirements are genuine or not (in a sense of ‘genuine’ that encodes more than a putative 
requirement’s merely having the right form to be a coherence requirement, but less than an assumption 
that the requirement is robustly normative). That is not to say that it will on its own clearly settle every 
controversial case, but it will at least show how the debate is to proceed. Third, it will aim to assign 
coherence requirements an important philosophical role (again, irrespective of their normative status). 
If we can find an account of coherence and of coherence requirements that satisfies these three aims, 
then coherence requirements will, I believe, earn their ontological keep. I do not aim to be giving a 
conceptual analysis of whatever is being picked out by all uses of the word ‘coherent’ in English. Nor 
will I treat our pre-theoretical, intuitive list of genuine coherence requirements (if there be such a list) 
as unrevisable (though no doubt the account shouldn’t make extensional predictions that deviate too 
wildly from this list). Rather, I will be looking for an interesting, well-regimented, philosophically 
important notion in the neighborhood of what we are talking about when we talk about coherence. 
In asking questions like “why care about coherence?”, it is easy to slip from the point of view 
of the agent asking whether coherence requirements matter normatively, to the point of view of the 
theorist asking whether coherence requirements matter philosophically. But not every philosophically 
important phenomenon is important normatively. In particular, the account I will give assigns 
coherence requirements an important and highly distinctive role in our (descriptive) philosophical 
psychology. So I hope that my account will make coherence requirements interesting even for those who 
are skeptical about their normativity. But equally, I think that my account could be accepted by 
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someone who thinks that coherence requirements are normative. I myself will take no firm stand on 
the debate about the normativity of coherence requirements here. 
The account of coherence (and of coherence requirements) that I am offered here might be 
thought of as a kind of naturalistic, reductive realism about this property, though the proper 
application of these labels is a notoriously fraught matter. In any case, I do not take the account 
developed here for coherence requirements to generalize to other, more “substantive” reasons and 
requirements. If anything, the particular version of the view I develop – especially its claims about the 
role of coherence requirements in our philosophical psychology – reinforces the metanormative 
disunity of these coherence requirements on one hand and substantive (moral, prudential, epistemic, 
etc) norms on the other.  
 
I. The view 
 
Here is the view. A set of attitudinal mental states is jointly incoherent iff it is (partially) constitutive 
of the mental states in question that, for any agent that holds these attitudes, the agent is disposed, 
when conditions of full transparency are met, to give up at least one of the attitudes. That is, human 
agents are disposed such that they are (at least normally) not able to (or at least find it difficult to) 
sustain such combinations of attitudes under conditions of full transparency. A putative coherence 
requirement is genuine iff every combination of states that it forbids is jointly incoherent.6 
“Attitudinal mental states” as I use the term includes both mental attitudes and absences of 
mental attitudes, such as the absence of a particular belief or intention. Some coherence requirements 
(for instance, the instrumental requirement) effectively ban one from having some attitude while 
lacking some other attitude, so this broadness is required for full generality.  
By “conditions of full transparency”, I mean conditions under which the agent knows, and 
explicitly and consciously believes, that she has the states in question, without self-deception, mental 
fragmentation, or any failure of self-knowledge (pertaining to those attitudes). Notice that it is not 
required for these conditions to be met that the agent acknowledge that her mental states violate a 
requirement as such. It is merely required that she acknowledge that she has the states that (perhaps 
unbeknownst to her) violate the requirement. 
The present account makes coherence a matter of whether (or how easily) agents can 
psychologically sustain the states in question under conditions of full transparency. However, notice 
that for a combination of states to be incoherent, it has to be true that any agent would be unable (or 
at least find it difficult) to sustain the states under full transparency. So it won’t suffice for incoherence 
that some individual agent has a psychological quirk such that they are disposed not to hold two 
attitudes jointly: the disposition has to be present in all agents. Moreover, this fact has to be 
constitutive of the mental states in question. There may be some states that all agents will find it hard 
                                                 
6 This allows, correctly, that the set of attitudinal mental states that is incoherent might have only one member. Most 
obviously, a single belief in a contradictory conjunction, (p and not-p), is incoherent (cf. Broome 2013: 153). By contrast 
with a purely formal account of coherence, my substantive account can explain why this requirement belongs with the 
others. 
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to simultaneously sustain, but where this is not constitutive of the states in question; the account does 
not count such combinations of states as incoherent. 
To clear one potential objection out of the way: the present account does not make violations 
of coherence requirements impossible. The view I am defending does not say that combinations of 
mental states are incoherent only when they are held under conditions of full transparency. Rather, it 
says that some combination of attitudes is incoherent in cases where the agent is disposed such that, 
were conditions of full transparency to be met, she would at least find it difficult to sustain the attitudes 
together.7 These attitudes are still incoherent when these conditions of full transparency are not in fact 
met (and when, consequently, they may not in fact be difficult to sustain). Moreover, conditions of full 
transparency are often not met.8 Consequently, my view allows that coherence requirements can often 
be violated. It does say that such violations will tend to involve some kind of failure of transparency. 
But I do not think that this is a bad consequence: in the next section, I will argue that, for paradigmatic 
coherence requirements, our making sense of violations of them relies on a tacit assumption that 
conditions of full transparency fail to obtain.  
Though this naïve objection fails as it stands, some philosophers may worry that nothing could 
be a requirement in virtue of descriptive facts about which states agents cannot psychologically sustain, 
even under conditions of full transparency. Others may worry that no combination of mental states is 
such that all agents would be disposed not to sustain it under conditions of full transparency, and that 
the present approach smacks of a priori armchair psychology. I will return to these objections later. 
  
II. Helpful illustrative cases 
 
We begin with some helpful cases that (I hope) make my view more plausible. We’ll come to a harder 
case later. 
 
(a) Instrumental irrationality 
 
Consider first the instrumental requirement. This requirement says, roughly, that the following 
combination of states is incoherent: intending an end, believing some means is necessary for that end, 
but not intending the means.  
 Suppose you know that your friend’s partner is cheating on her, and that she will discover this 
soon. You believe that it would be better if she heard it from you, both for her and for you (since she 
will also find out that you knew). So you intend to be the one who tells her about the infidelity. You 
also believe that today is the last day on which you have the opportunity to tell her, and that the only 
way to do so is to call her. So, you would violate the instrumental requirement if you lacked the 
intention to call her today. 
                                                 
7 In this respect the view is like reductive subjectivist analyses of value that identify something’s being valuable with it’s 
being the case that an agent would value it under certain ideal conditions (cf., e.g., Lewis 1989). Such analyses obviously 
don’t say that the thing in question ceases to be valuable when the ideal conditions aren’t met. 
8 For arguments that such conditions are often not met, see e.g. Williamson 2000: ch. 4; Schwitzgebel 2008; Srinivasan 
2015. 
6 
 
 Might you lack that intention? Yes.9 But let’s contrast two ways in which we might try to tell 
the story about how you do so. The easiest way to make that possibility clear and intelligible is to reach 
for some story on which your mental states are not fully transparent to you. So, perhaps your mental 
states are fragmented.10 “Somewhere” in your mind intend to tell your friend, and “somewhere” in 
your mind you know that to do this you must call her. But you never put these two mental states 
together or reflect on what they jointly commit you to. By putting at least one of the two states out of 
your occurrent reach – perhaps subconsciously motivated by the awkwardness of calling your friend 
– you never come to intend to call her. This is a familiar kind of failure. It wouldn’t be correct for you, 
if pressed after the fact, to deny that you intended to tell your friend about the infidelity, nor for you 
to deny that you knew that you had to call her. You just avoided simultaneous, conscious consideration 
of the fact that you had both of those states. And so you managed never to form the intention to call 
her. 
 Suppose now, however, that we try to tell the story so that your mental states are fully 
transparent to you. So here, you explicitly say: “Absolutely: I intend to tell my friend about the 
infidelity. And the only way to do that is to call her today. But I have no intention whatsoever to call 
her today.” The most natural way to hear your speech here is as a joke. Why is that? Because if you 
were to sincerely utter these words, you would be confused about what it is to have an intention. Why 
is that? Because someone who is in this position doesn’t really count as genuinely intending to tell her 
friend about the infidelity. It is part of what it is to intend an end that one also be disposed, under 
conditions of full transparency, to form corresponding intentions to intend the means that one believes to 
be necessary to that end (or to give up the intended end).  
 That isn’t to say that one cannot be in various, weaker states with respect to the end. One can 
certainly desire or wish that one tells one’s friend about the infidelity, or think that it would be good if 
one did so, while not forming the intention to call one’s friend. On any account, we need some way 
of distinguishing these weaker states from intention proper. On the present account, it is part of what 
distinguishes these weaker states from the stronger state of intention that they can persist even in the 
face of conscious, reflective recognition that one is not following through on the (believed) means. 
And this, in turn, is why the instrumental requirement as stated above is genuine, but analogues of it 
that substitute desire or wishing for intention are bogus. 
 
(b) Transitivity 
 
We want to demonstrate that the present account can unify apparently disparate coherence 
requirements, showing how violations of them can each be incoherent in a single, core sense. So let’s 
next turn to a rather different sort of coherence requirement, often found in decision theory and 
economics: that of transitivity of preference. This requirement bans one from simultaneously 
preferring A to B, preferring B to C, and preferring C to A.  
                                                 
9 Pace Finlay (2009), who argues that violation of the requirement of instrumental rationality is impossible simpliciter. I 
think that much of what motivates Finlay’s argument is right, but that it overreaches. Violations of instrumental 
rationality require non-transparency, but are not impossible simpliciter.  
10 See, e.g., Stalnaker (1984); Egan (2008).  
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Here is a case of violation of transitivity which is easy to imagine. Consider the three following 
things that a philosopher might do with his Saturday: working on his new article, volunteering at the 
homeless shelter, or re-watching series 4 of Friday Night Lights. 
 
 Attending to the options of working on his article and volunteering at the homeless shelter, 
working on the article seems like an important project that he can justifiably pick over 
volunteering, and which allows him to stay in his pajamas and not have to interact with anyone. 
So he prefers working on his article to volunteering. 
 Attending to the options of volunteering at the homeless shelter and re-watching series 4 of 
Friday Night Lights, choosing to do something so trivial as watch TV rather than volunteering 
seems callous. So he prefer volunteering to watching TV. 
 But, attending to the options of watching Friday Night Lights and working on his new article, 
the writing of the article seems difficult and energy-consuming after his long week, and it’s not 
like it’s morally required. So he prefers watching TV to working on his article. 
 
These preferences are intransitive. Yet, again, what is crucial in the telling of the story here is that the 
philosopher only thinks about the pairwise comparisons one at a time. This isn’t to say that the 
philosophy doesn’t have the preferences simultaneously; non-occurrent, dispositional preferences are 
possible. But again, consider what it would be for such a violation to be fully transparent to the agent. 
Imagine the philosopher having all three options vividly before his mind, and sincerely declaring, “I 
prefer working on my article to volunteering, I prefer volunteering to watching TV, and I prefer 
watching TV to working on my article.” Again, this sounds like a joke. Once the philosopher vividly 
attends to the intransitivity, he will feel a pressure to resolve it. If he does not, these are not all-things-
considered preferences, but only pro tanto desires. 
Yet he can get away with never vividly attending to it. Here’s one way that it’s depressingly 
likely to go: by focusing first on the choice between the article and the volunteering, he rules out the 
volunteering and puts that out of his mind. Then he compares the article and the TV, and picks the 
TV. So, he ends up watching TV, never attending to the comparison between volunteering and 
watching TV. 
 
(c) Inter-level coherence 
 
For our third example, let us turn to a requirement on doxastic states only, that I will call “inter-level 
coherence”.11 Inter-level coherence bans incoherent combinations of first-order and higher-order 
doxastic attitudes, where the latter are judgments about which first-order attitudes one’s evidence 
supports. For instance, it forbids believing p while also believing that one lacks adequate evidence for 
p.  
                                                 
11 See Worsnip (forthcoming) for an explication and defense. 
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 Again, we can make sense of violations of inter-level coherence.12 For example, suppose that 
Fabian considers himself to be extremely attractive to most members of the opposite sex. Suppose 
also that Fabian is aware of a body of psychological research that shows that people like him tend to 
systematically overestimate their attractiveness to the opposite sex, and that the women he tries to 
seduce often ask him to leave them alone. When Fabian reflects on all of this, he is inclined to admit 
that his evidence that he is extremely attractive to most members of the opposite sex is pretty lousy. 
But he doesn’t like to dwell on that. When he starts to think like that, he just jumps in his sports car, 
rolls down the windows, turns the volume on his stereo up to 11 and goes for a spin, and very soon 
he stops thinking about it. His belief that he is extremely attractive to most members of the opposite 
sex survives. 
Again, this isn’t to say that there is never a single moment where Fabian both believes that he 
is extremely attractive to most members of the opposite sex and believes that this belief of his not 
well-supported by the evidence. One does not count as having suspended one’s beliefs merely because 
they are not occurrent. But – again – what is hard to make sense of in Fabian is a persistent, stable 
state whereby he consciously and transparently violates inter-level coherence. There is something 
incredibly odd about an utterance like “all my evidence suggests that I’m not very attractive to 
members of the opposite sex. Nevertheless, in fact I am very attractive to members of the opposite 
sex.” Again, it sounds like a kind of joke. There is a strong pressure to interpret the agent either as not 
really believing that his total set of evidence suggests that he is not attractive, or as not really believing 
that he is attractive. One of the cognitive states may be weaker: it may be a fantasy, or a wish, or a 
hope, or an assumption, or faith, but not a belief. Part of what it is for something to be a belief, in 
contrast to these weaker states, is for it not to be reflectively sustainable in the face of an acknowledged 
judgment that it is not supported by the evidence. 
 I think that something like the story that I am sketching here is implicit in many explanations 
explain why it is so hard for us to “believe at will”. In at least the most paradigmatic cases of (trying 
to) believe at will, one tries to believe something for pragmatic reasons, despite taking oneself to lack 
evidential grounds for this belief. Numerous prominent philosophers have claimed that this is because 
our beliefs are in some sense “controlled” by our evidence.13 One finds writers saying things like 
“believing in opposition to one’s evidence is motivationally unintelligible,”14 or “one particular belief-
forming process, reasoning, is regulated solely by evidential considerations.”15 
On their most obvious interpretations, however, these claims are false, for a simple reason: we 
fail to believe in line with what our evidence supports absolutely constantly. Moreover, such failures 
are not always results of non-transparency: they can simply be the result of mistaken assessments of 
what the evidence supports. However, if the picture I am suggesting is right, there may be a truth in 
the neighborhood here. What these writers should have said (or, if we’re feeling charitable, meant to 
say) is that our beliefs, when they are formed reflectively in ways that are transparent to us, are 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, some have been tempted to suggest that violations of what I’m calling inter-level coherence are 
impossible simpliciter: see esp. Hurley (1989: 130-5, 159-70) and Adler (2002). I think this over-reaches, for reasons I’m 
about to explain. 
13 Cf., e.g., Williams (1973); Foley (1993: 16); Adler (2002); Hieronymi (2006). 
14 Adler (2002: 8). 
15 Shah (2003: 462).  
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controlled by our judgments about the evidence. In other words, we cannot reflectively sustain 
transparent inter-level coherence. That may explain why it is so hard to believe at will, where this 
involves transparently defying one’s own judgment about the evidence.16 
 
III. Taking stock: the emerging picture of coherence 
 
Here is the picture that is emerging. Suppose we have an apparent violation of a coherence 
requirement. On my account, (at least) one of two things must be the case. First, it could be that the 
agent’s mental states are not fully transparent to her on this occasion. In that case, the violation could 
be perfectly genuine. Secondly, though, it could be that we ought not really to attribute to the agent 
the mental states that violate the coherence requirement. The idea that I have tried to make plausible 
is that an apparent intention, belief or other attitude that, given the agent’s other mental states, will 
put her in sustained, transparent violation of a coherence requirement does not really count as an instance 
of that attitude: it is not intention or belief proper, but something less – for example, instead of an 
intention, a wish or desire; instead of a belief, a pretense or a supposition. 
 That may seem like too much of a just so story. But on any account of attitudinal mental states, 
we need something that will distinguish particular attitudinal mental states from others: that will 
explain just when something is not merely a supposition but a belief; not merely a desire but an 
intention. My proposal is that we do this by appeal to a particular kind of disposition that agents have 
to revise these mental states. For example, it is part of what it is for one to have an intention (rather 
than, say, a desire) that one be disposed such that if one finds oneself transparently holding that intention 
and a belief that some means is required for the carrying out of that intention, but not intending the 
means, one revises one’s attitudes such that one either comes to intend the means, gives up the means-
ends belief, or gives up the original intention. If this is not the case, one falls short of genuinely 
intending.17  
 This puts us in a position to answer several possible objections to the present account. First, 
the charge of a priori psychology. There are, of course, many questions about our attitudes that cannot 
be answered without detailed empirical investigation. But there are also prior philosophical questions: 
what is it for something to be a belief, or an intention? How do we know what to look for when we do 
our empirical investigation of our belief and intention-forming practices? On the account I have 
developed, the claims about how it is hard (or even impossible) to hold two attitudes jointly under 
conditions of full transparency turn out to fall out of our best answers to these prior philosophical 
questions. They are, thus, not empirical predictions made from the armchair.18 To the extent that a 
distinction between observation and philosophical theory is possible, they do not rule out any 
particular observational data, but are rather claims about how to philosophically interpret such 
observational data. It is thus not outrageous to say that these claims apply to all agents. Indeed, any 
account of a mental state in terms of meeting a condition or set of conditions C rules out, in advance, 
                                                 
16 I tried to sketch such an explanation in (Worsnip 2015: ch. 4). See also Winters (1979) and Setiya (2008). 
17 Must there be some deeper (e.g. functionalist) explanation of why such dispositions are constitutive of the mental 
states in question? I leave this open. It is consistent with my account if there is. 
18 See also Blackburn (1998: 54-59). 
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the possibility of agents who meet C and lack the state (or have the state and fail to meet C). So any 
objection to my account on these grounds would generalize to any such theory. 
 Relatedly, here is an objection that can be cooked up to any claim that some particular 
coherence requirement is hard (or impossible) to transparently violate: “consider person X. Person X 
reports herself as violating this coherence requirement. Surely person X is possible. But it’s an ad hoc, 
theory-driven move to say that person X must be mistaken when she reports her mental states. So it 
is possible to transparently violate this coherence requirement.” Such an objection can be sharpened 
if we make person X a sophisticated person with a philosophical theory that rationalizes the 
combination of mental states from their point of view. They might be someone who (rightly or 
wrongly) denies that the states in question are, in fact, incoherent. For example, for the 
noncontradiction requirement, we can imagine a dialetheist who thinks there can be true 
contradictions. Surely, it is said, a sophisticated person might transparently violate this requirement by 
believing p and believing not-p. The dialetheist’s mental states, it will be said, may still be irrational or 
incoherent, but surely they are still possible.19 How can I say that a sophisticated dialetheist doesn’t even 
know her own beliefs?! 
 I won’t disagree that we can always imagine someone who says that she (transparently) violates 
some coherence requirement. The question is whether we are beholden to interpret her attitudes in 
the way that she herself reports them. Again, the problem with the assumption that we are is that it 
can be used to generalize the above objection to all accounts of individual attitudinal mental states. 
Again, suppose you have a theory of belief of the generic form: for an agent to believe some 
proposition p just is for that agent to satisfy condition C with respect to p. Now, I can object: well, I 
can imagine someone who reports herself as believing p, but as not satisfying condition C with respect 
to p. And, I might add, this person has a sophisticated theory of belief, which involves rejecting the 
claim that believing p is a matter of satisfying condition C. Surely, I may now say, it’s an ad hoc, theory-
driven move to say that she must be mistaken when she reports her mental states. Therefore, I 
conclude, believing p is not a matter of satisfying condition C. Thus, we have a recipe for objecting to 
any theory of belief (or indeed any other attitude) in terms of some condition(s). 
Thus, any non-vacuous theory of belief will issue the verdict that particular subjects, even 
sophisticated subjects, misclassify themselves as having or not having particular beliefs. If this is a 
problem for my view, it is a problem for every view. Once the generality of the objection is laid bare, 
it is apparent that it is too quick. If we have good theoretical grounds to say that subjects misclassify 
their own mental states, we should not be held hostage to their self-attributions.  
Indeed, in the case of the dialetheist specifically, I do find it hard to make sense of what it 
means to attribute a transparent state of believing p and believing not-p to someone, no matter how 
much a person professes those beliefs.20 And my view in not alone in this: it’s not clear how a 
dispositional theory of belief, for example, or a possible worlds theory of belief, makes sense of such 
a person. Of course, you may disagree with me here, and think that it is easy to make sense of a 
dialetheist’s beliefs, even under transparent conditions. But, I submit that, to the extent that you think 
that, you think that the dialetheist isn’t really incoherent, and thus you reject the noncontradiction 
                                                 
19 Bruno Whittle pressed this objection particularly forcefully. 
20 Note that this isn’t to say that the dialetheist can’t (transparently) hold the belief that there are true contradictions.  
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requirement, at least in its universal and exceptionless form. In that case, the example is no threat to 
the theory of incoherence that I have offered here.  
 Next, the present account makes explicit why coherence requirements, independently of their 
normative status, have an important philosophical role to play. Specifically, coherence requirements – 
or, more specifically, the assumption that agents are disposed to obey such requirements under 
conditions of full transparency – play a constitutive role in our attributions of mental states. We can 
attribute mental states to individuals by backgrounding other mental states of theirs and seeing what 
is needed to make coherent sense of their intentions as manifested in their behavior – at least when 
we take conditions of transparency to be generally met. A similar process allows us to explain and 
predict this behavior. 
 If this sort of story sounds familiar, it should: it is highly reminiscent of the “interpretationist” 
theory of belief and other mental states associated especially with Donald Davidson.21 Davidson 
memorably claimed that in order to be able to interpret other agents, we have to assume that these 
agents are rational. However, the view developed here represents a particular version and 
precisification of this view. When Davidson says that we must assume that agents are rational, many 
have interpreted him as claiming that to attribute mental states to agents, we must see them as 
conforming to substantive norms: as doing and believing what they really have reason to do and believe; 
as believing the truth, and pursuing the good.22 This assumption seems to many to be crazy. Human 
beings are very bad at doing what they have most reason to do. Indeed, on many plausible enough 
normative theories – views that combine a demanding view of morality with the view that morality 
gives us weighty and categorical reasons – we almost never do what we have most practical reason to 
do. It would be very odd if our philosophical psychology ruled these substantive normative theories 
out in advance, and utterly misguided to predict behavior on the assumption that we will comply with 
them. 
 My claim is that things are quite different when it is coherence requirements that are at issue. 
On my view, it is not a precondition of interpretation that we assume that agents do or believe what 
they have most reason to do. But it is a precondition of interpretation that we assume that agents are 
disposed to be coherent under conditions of mental transparency.23 Take a variant of a classic, well-
worn example: I know that Tim intends to drink a beer, and I see him heading for the fridge 
(manifesting his intention to open the fridge). On that basis, I attribute the belief that there is beer in 
the fridge to Tim. I am assuming that Tim’s intentions, desires and beliefs fit together coherently here. 
If I didn’t think that that, I would have no reason to favor attributing the belief that there is beer in 
the fridge over the belief that the fridge is empty and that the only available beer is in the garage. The 
latter interpretation literally doesn’t make sense of Tim’s behavior, namely his heading for the fridge 
rather than the garage. An assumption of coherence is thus needed to attribute mental states to Tim, 
and to explain and predict his actions.  
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Davidson (1980: essay 12, 2004: essay 6). See also, inter alia, Dennett (1971). 
22 I doubt that this common interpretation of Davidson is correct. See especially Davidson (2004: essays 11-12, e.g. p. 
170), where he restricts his interpretationist doctrine at least primarily to rationality as coherence. 
23 The “under conditions of mental transparency” qualification also (alongside the restriction of the doctrine to 
coherence requirements) represents a qualification of interpretationism as standardly understood.  
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However, I need not assume that Tim is really responding to his substantive reasons. Perhaps 
he ought not to be drinking beer; perhaps he ought to be attending his child support hearing. Perhaps 
he ought not even believe that there is beer in the fridge: in fact, he is basing his belief on a vague 
memory of having put the beer there, and he could well have drunk it last night and forgotten, or it 
could well have been taken by his brother Billy in the intervening time. Neither of these possibilities 
interfere with me reading the belief that there is beer in the fridge off of his behavior. They do not 
make that behavior unintelligible in the way that his actually believing that there is no beer in the fridge 
would.  
 
IV. A hard case: enkrasia 
 
We want our account to deliver an extensionally adequate account of incoherence that covers the 
clearest examples of coherence requirements. I cannot consider every putative coherence requirement. 
But let’s focus on one that threatens to make particular trouble for the account: the “enkratic” 
requirement. 
According to numerous philosophers, there is a coherence requirement forbidding akrasia: 
that is, forbidding one from simultaneously believing one ought to Φ but not intending to Φ.24 But 
there is widespread consensus that clear-eyed akrasia is possible. One can think that one ought to do 
something, and have this thought quite clearly at the front of one’s mind, but realize that one’s 
intentions fail to match up to what one ought to do. This appears to be a violation of a coherence 
requirement without any kind of failure of transparency. Yet we still want to describe akrasia as 
irrational, in the sense of rationality that deals with coherence. We thus seem to have a counterexample 
to my claim that two or more states are incoherent only all agents must be disposed not to sustain 
them under conditions of full transparency. 
 One could try to straightforwardly resist this counterexample to my account in one of two 
ways. One way would be to hold a very hardline version of motivational internalism about normative 
judgment, on which if a putative normative judgment does not produce an intention to comply with 
that judgment (under conditions of transparency), it isn’t a normative judgment after all.25 Putative 
normative judgments that do not produce intentions should actually be classified as other cognitive 
states (perhaps as purely descriptive beliefs or as what Hare called “inverted commas” judgments).26 
This would precisely mirror the treatment I gave of putative transparent violations of our paradigm 
requirements in section II.  
 While I have more sympathy for this line of thought than many philosophers do, I still believe 
that as it stands it is unreasonably strong. In the cases of instrumental irrationality and inter-level 
coherence, it was (I think) not too much of a stretch of the ordinary notion of belief and intention to 
say that the putative transparent violations of the requirements in fact involved something less than 
full-blown belief and intention. But it is a real stretch to say that the ordinary notion of normative 
judgment does not allow for an intelligible notion of (clear-eyed, or transparent) akrasia.  
                                                 
24 Cf. esp. Broome (2013); see also (e.g.) Kolodny (2005), Scanlon (2007), and Setiya (2007).  
25 Cf. Hare (1952: 19-20, 169-70). 
26 Ibid.: 164-5. 
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 The second line of resistance would be to simply deny that akrasia really is incoherent, at least 
in the sense that we have identified and in which violations of the other requirements we have 
discussed are incoherent. Again, I have some sympathy with this. There is, I think, a good sense in 
which someone who says “there’s conclusive evidence that giving to charity saves lives, but giving to 
charity doesn’t save lives” is incoherent in a deeper way than someone who says “I ought to give most 
of my earnings to charity, but I’m not going to do so”. It is precisely the fact that the former is harder 
to make sense of than the latter than seems to make it appropriate to brand the former as a more 
radical kind of incoherence. This reveals an asymmetry between practical akrasia and inter-level 
incoherence that questions whether they should really be thought of as pure analogues of one another 
(as the label “epistemic akrasia” suggests).27 
Nevertheless, as it stands the second proposal also feels too strong. Rejecting the enkratic 
requirement wholesale, and saying that there is nothing irrational about believing one ought to do 
something but not intending to do it, is a drastic move. 
 So what I propose is a kind of compromise between the two lines of resistance that moderates 
each. We should allow that incoherence is something that comes in degrees, and that violations of 
some requirements are more incoherent than others.28 For example, violations of inter-level coherence 
(or indeed of the instrumental requirement) are more incoherent than violations of the enkratic 
requirement; but the latter are still somewhat incoherent. This can be accommodated by our account 
of incoherence by saying that, correspondingly, the strength of the disposition not to sustain attitudes 
jointly (under conditions of full transparency) can also come in degrees. The most incoherent sets of 
mental states are ones whereby the disposition is so strong that it cannot be blocked; these sets of 
states will be impossible to sustain jointly under conditions of full transparency. But in less incoherent 
cases, such as akrasia, the disposition is weak enough to sometimes be blocked.  
We can then agree with the motivational internalist that it is partially constitutive of normative 
judgment that the agent have some disposition not to be in a sustained and transparent state of holding 
that normative judgment while having no intention to comply with it.29 One of the ways that we get a 
grip on what it is to make a normative judgment is by focusing on this motivating role. Accordingly, 
there is some pressure on us not to interpret agents as consistently defying their own normative 
judgments. But this pressure is not always insurmountable: if enough other markers of normative 
judgment are there, we can attribute clear-eyed akrasia to agents nevertheless.  
 Some may wish to say that this is the right way to handle the other examples of coherence 
requirements we considered – allowing the disposition not to hold such states jointly under conditions 
of full transparent to be blocked in certain cases. This would allow for the metaphysical possibility of 
sustained and transparent violations of those requirements also. It would be enough that agents must, 
to count as having such states, must have some disposition not to engage in such sustained and 
                                                 
27 In Worsnip (forthcoming), I argue that there is a rationale for inter-level coherence that finds no analogue in the 
practical case. 
28 Fogal (ms.) argues that the degreed nature of incoherence makes talk of coherence requirements inappropriate. I am not 
fully persuaded of this: it may be that the strength or ‘force’ of a requirement can itself come in degrees, or alternatively 
that something’s being a requirement is a matter of its forbidding states that are sufficiently incoherent, where there is 
some minimum threshold for this sufficiency. 
29 For congenial views, see Jackson & Pettit (1995: esp. 35-38) and Blackburn (1998: 61).  
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transparent violations – and so that the assumption that agents fulfil these requirements plays some 
constitutive role in our mental state attribution. Although I am inclined to take a harder line on at least 
some coherence requirements, as shown by my treatment of cases in section II, I would still count 
this stance as a version of my view. 
 
V. Naturalism and normativity 
 
This completes my defense of my account of (in)coherence and of coherence requirements. For any 
individual requirement, there is of course room for dispute. But I think that, in general, to the extent 
that someone disputes that agents must be disposed not to transparently sustain violations of some 
putative requirement, they will also be inclined to dispute that it really is incoherent to violate this 
putative requirement: that is, to dispute that the requirement is genuine. If this is so, it is actually 
confirming evidence for my account. 
As I said at the start, the account I have offered might be understood as a form of naturalistic, 
reductive realism about coherence. I have identified the property of coherence, as it attaches to sets 
of mental states, with a psychological property of these sets of mental states: that agent’s being 
disposed not to sustain them jointly under conditions of full transparency.30 Now, one might in 
principle agree with me that these two properties are co-extensive – that is, that incoherent states are 
states that are such that we are disposed not to sustain them under conditions of transparency, and 
vice versa – without agreeing that they are identical. After all, this move is often made by non-
naturalists in metaethical debates about moral properties. I don’t have a knockdown objection to this 
view, and I think the view I’ve offered would be interesting even understood as a claim about (mere) 
necessary coextension rather than property identity. However, I do think there is one way in which 
the move from necessary coextension to property identity is on stronger ground when it comes to 
coherence as compared to morality, as I’ll now explain. 
Reductive naturalists about morality often say that property identity is the best explanation of 
the co-extensiveness and thus of the supervenience of the moral on the natural.31 But non-naturalists 
have a reply to this: that the co-extensiveness of moral rightness with certain natural properties is 
explained by one or more very general, irreducibly normative, principles that specify that an act is right 
iff it has some particular natural features. If these principles are necessary, then we get an explanation 
                                                 
30 One might hesitate to call the view ‘naturalistic’, on the grounds that the attitudinal mental states are themselves not 
“naturalistic” on the interpretationist view that I have endorsed. Dennett and Davidson themselves encourage this, but I 
doubt that there is really any tension between interpretationism and naturalism. I cannot resolve this here, but in any 
case, my view is as naturalistic about coherence requirements as it is about mental states. 
A distinct worry is that the account isn’t reductive because it explicates coherence in terms of dispositions to sustain 
or give up mental states, but those mental states themselves have to be understood partly in terms of coherence 
requirements. Thus, it is at most a virtuously circular explication, rather than a reductive analysis. There is a subtle sleight 
of hand in this objection. All that needs to enter into the attribution of mental states is the assumption that we are 
disposed to combine or not combine mental states in various ways. Such dispositions can be described without any 
reference to coherence or coherence requirements. My account does say that we should ultimately identify incoherence 
with the sets of attitudes that we are disposed not to combine. So, it will be true that the dispositions not to combine 
states are effectively dispositions not to be incoherent. Nevertheless, coherence is still reduced to psychological 
dispositions that can be described without reference to coherence, which is enough to avoid circularity. 
31 See, e.g., McPherson (2012). 
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of the co-extensiveness of moral and natural properties, and of the supervenience of the moral on the 
natural.32  
This is not the place to adjudicate the adequacy of this reply. What I want to point out is that 
such a non-naturalist reply is a non-starter in the case of coherence requirements. There is not, on any 
view I know of, some master normative principle of coherence that enjoins one not to be in states 
that one is disposed not to sustain under conditions of transparency. So there is no fundamental, 
irreducibly normative principle that can explain the co-extensiveness of the property of coherence and 
the property of being sustainable under conditions of transparency. Thus, the claim that those 
properties are in fact the same property seems the most plausible way to go. This suggests that the 
naturalist is better off (or even better off!) in the case of coherence requirements than in the case of 
substantive moral requirements.  
This connects to the more general point I foreshadowed at the start, that I see no reason to 
think that the account I have offered offers any particularly strong support for reductive realism about 
other requirements or normative claims, for example substantive moral requirements. I have already 
explained why I do not think that substantive reasons and requirements play the same role in the 
interpretation of mental states, or the explanation and prediction of behavior, that coherence 
requirements do. I am much less sympathetic to naturalistic, reductive realism about moral 
requirements than to naturalistic, reductive realism about coherence requirements.33 The possibility 
that we might give very different metanormative accounts of coherence requirements and of other, 
substantive (e.g. moral) requirements reinforces the distinctness of coherence requirements on one 
hand and these other, substantive requirements on the other. 
 No doubt some will think this shows that, on the account developed here, coherence 
requirements are not really normative, or perhaps that they are not really requirements, in any good 
sense, at all. They have, these people will say, stopped functioning as normative requirements and 
become merely descriptive truths about psychology. As I said in the introduction, I want to be neutral 
on whether coherence requirements are normative in the most robust sense of that term. My aim here 
was not to show that they are, but rather to earn them their ontological keep in a different sort of way. 
Nevertheless, let me make three preliminary points on this issue.  
First, to the extent that there is a phenomenon to be saved here, it is not most naturally 
characterized in terms of the language of ‘normative requirements’ but rather in terms of the language 
of ‘rationality’. What we want to earn the license to say is that incoherent combinations of mental 
states are irrational. But the account of coherence that I have given does connect with a long and 
venerable tradition of thinking about rationality that is recognizable in the ways that ordinary people 
actually use the concept. One important idea is that that rationality consists in intelligibility: irrationality 
is a way of being harder to make sense of as an agent.34 Another is that rationality is the norm – in the 
‘default’ or ‘statistical’ rather than the robustly normative sense of ‘norm’ – on the basis of which we 
predict human behavior and ascribe mental states – an assumption engrained both in academic social 
                                                 
32 Cf. Enoch (2011: ch. 6); Scanlon (2014: ch. 2). 
33 Similarly, Ridge (2014) advocates reductive realism about “rationality” (that is, coherence), but an “ecumenical 
expressivism” about moral (and other substantive normative) judgments. 
34 Cf., again, Davidson (2004). 
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science and in ordinary talk. So, even if this notion of coherence turns out not to count as normative 
in the most robust sense, I do not think that it “changes the subject”. If someone concedes this but 
simply insists that the word ‘requirement’ must be expunged from my account, I will feel contented 
overall.35 
Secondly, however, it is not obvious that in giving a reductive, naturalistic, account of 
coherence requirements, we thereby preclude them from counting as normative even in a robust sense. 
At least, this should be a matter for debate. Naturalists about moral norms are often accused of being 
unable to account for the normativity of morality36 – and while such criticisms may hit their target, it 
is not just obvious that they do so. Just because we have identified the property of coherence with a 
psychologically describable property does not immediately entail, without argument, that this property 
cannot be normative.37 
Third, as participants in both the debate about the normativity of rationality and the debate 
about reductive realism in metaethics have noted,38 the term ‘normative’ can be used to stand for a 
range of things, and some requirement might be normative in one sense but not in another. Naturalist 
realists tend to argue that morality is (necessarily) normative in some but not all of these senses.39 It 
may turn out that coherence requirements are as naturalist realists say that moral requirements are, in 
this respect. Moreover, those who are dissatisfied with anything other than the most robust kind of 
normativity in the moral case need not take the same view when it comes to coherence requirements. 
For the intuitive appearance that coherence requirements are normative is, in my view, somewhat less 
robust than the intuitive appearance that moral requirements are normative. Ultimately, there may be 
less normativity to account for in the former case than the latter.  
I cannot resolve these questions here. But I hope that the account of coherence that I have 
offered lends adequate determinacy to that notion for the debate about the normativity of coherence 
requirements to be conducted in a reasonably orderly manner. And however we eventually resolve 
this debate, I hope that the account I’ve given evidences an underlying unity behind talk of coherence 
in many of its superficially disjunct guises, and that this unified notion is philosophically interesting 
independently of its normative status.  
 
References 
 
Adler, J.E. (2002). ‘Akratic Believing?,’ Philosophical Studies, 110: 1-27.  
Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Broome, J. (2005). ‘Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?,’ Philosophical Issues, 15: 321-337. 
-------- (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
                                                 
35 If, as I suggested, coherence is a necessary condition for rationality, there is at least one sense in which there are 
coherence requirements: there are conditions of coherence that one must satisfy if one is to count as being rational. 
Broome (2013: 109-110) calls this the “property” sense of ‘requirement’. 
36 Cf., e.g., Nagel (1986: ch. 8); Parfit (2011); Enoch (2011: ch. 5, esp. 107-8). 
37 See Railton (1989); Schroeder (2005). 
38 For the former, see e.g. Southwood (2008) and Ridge (2014: ch. 8). For the latter, see e.g. Copp (2007). 
39 See, again, Copp (2007). Some naturalist realists, such as the early Railton (1986), argued that morality is normative (in 
the most robust sense) only derivatively on instrumental rationality. 
17 
 
Copp, D. (2007). ‘Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity,’ in his Morality in a Natural 
World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
-------- (2004). Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dennett, D. (1971). ‘Intentional Systems,’ Journal of Philosophy, 68/4: 87-106. 
Egan, A. (2008). ‘Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation and the Divided Mind,’ 
Philosophical Studies, 140/1: 47-63. 
Elga, A. (2005). ‘On Overrating Oneself…and Knowing It,’ Philosophical Studies, 133/1-2: 115-124. 
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Finlay, S. (2009). ‘Against All Reason? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm,’ in Pigden (ed.), 
Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fogal, D. (ms.). ‘Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure,’ draft manuscript. 
Foley, R. (1993). Working without a Net. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hare, R.M. (1952). The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hieronymi, P. (2006). ‘Controlling Attitudes,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87/1: 45-74. 
Hurley, S.L. (1989). Natural Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jackson, F. & Pettit, P. (1995). ‘Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,’ Philosophical Quarterly, 
45/178: 20-40. 
Kolodny, N. (2005). ‘Why be rational?,’ Mind, 114/455: 509-563. 
Lewis, D. (1989). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume, 63: 113-137. 
Lord, E. (forthcoming). ‘What You’re Rationally Required To Do and What You Ought To Do (Are 
the Same Thing!), Mind. 
McPherson, T. (2012). ‘Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience,’ in Shafer-
Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nagel, T. (1986). The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Railton, P. (1986). ‘Moral Realism,’ Philosophical Review, 95/2: 163-207. 
-------- (1989). ‘Naturalism and Prescriptivity,’ Social Philosophy and Policy, 7/1: 151-74. 
Raz, J. (2005). ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1. 
Ridge, M. (2014). Impassioned Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ross, J. (2012). ‘Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment,’ in Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Scanlon, T.M. (2007). ‘Structural Irrationality,’ in Brennan, Goodin, Jackson & Smith (eds.), Common 
Minds: Themes from the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
-------- (2014). Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schroeder, M. (2005). ‘Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness,’ Philosophers’ Imprint, 5/1. 
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008). ‘The Unreliability of Naïve Introspection,’ Philosophical Review, 117/2: 245-
73. 
Setiya, K. (2007). ‘Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,’ Ethics, 117/4: 649-73. 
18 
 
-------- (2008). ‘Believing at Will,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 32: 36-52. 
Shah, N. (2003). ‘How Truth Governs Belief,’ Philosophical Review, 112/4: 447-482. 
Srinivasan, A. (2015). ‘Are We Luminous?,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90/2: 294-319. 
Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Williams, B.A.O. (1973). ‘Deciding to Believe,’ in his Problems of the Self. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Winters, B. (1979). ‘Believing at Will,’ Journal of Philosophy, 76/5: 243-256. 
Worsnip, A. (2015). Rationality’s Demands on Belief. Doctoral dissertation, Yale University. 
-------- (forthcoming). ‘The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12246. 
